NOMA

WHITE PAPER

Lethal by Design:

MCP Servers, Skills, and the Weaponization of Agent Capabilities



Contents

The Problem No One's Talking About - MCPs and Skills Yield Different Risks

When security teams approach AI agent risk, they reach for familiar tools. Scan the MCP servers, review the supply chain, check for known vulnerabilities. It's necessary work, but it addresses roughly half the problem.

The other half is harder to see. It lives not in the code agents execute, but in the reasoning they perform. When an agent is manipulated through its instructions rather than its tools, no structured log is produced.

The attack happens silently, inside the model's context window, and the only evidence may be an email or a shell command that looks entirely routine.

This is the asymmetry problem. The two dominant mechanisms for extending agent capabilities, MCP servers and Skills, introduce risk at fundamentally different layers of the agent stack. MCP risk is largely observable.

Skill risk is largely invisible. Most organizations are governing the observable half and leaving the opaque half entirely unaddressed.

This paper presents what we found when we analyzed hundreds of the most popular MCP servers and Skills in the wild, and a framework for governing both.

Why Input-Focused Frameworks Aren't Enough

What Teams Get Wrong About Agentic Risk

Before we examine the asymmetry in detail, it's worth addressing the frameworks most teams currently use to reason about agentic risk, because they set the wrong starting point.

The most widely adopted model is Meta's "Agents Rule of Two", which holds that an AI agent becomes dangerous when it simultaneously processes untrusted inputs, accesses sensitive data, and either changes state or communicates externally. Limit the agent to any two of the three, and you've deterministically reduced the highest-impact consequences of prompt injection.

This is intuitive. It's also insufficient. Real-world incidents have broken its core assumptions.

In July 2025, a hacker injected a destructive prompt into the Amazon Q extension for VS Code via a GitHub pull request. The embedded instruction told the AI agent to wipe the local filesystem and delete AWS cloud resources. No exfiltration. No external communication.

Just untrusted input meeting destructive capability. Two out of three, and the result was a potential system wipe. That same month, Replit's AI coding agent deleted an entire production database containing over 1,200 executive records during a code freeze.

The agent wasn't processing untrusted external input or exfiltrating data. It hallucinated and executed destructive commands it should never have had permission to run. One out of three, **and the result was complete data loss with no attacker involved.**

The Rule of Two focuses on the sources of risk, i.e which properties an agent has. What these incidents reveal is the blast radius of how much damage an agent can actually do when something goes wrong. An agent that satisfies all three conditions but requires human approval before every sensitive action may be safer than an agent with only two properties running fully autonomously. The Rule of Two can't capture this distinction.

> The No Excessive CAP framework, introduced later in this paper, shifts governance from the properties you can't fully control (whether an agent will encounter malicious input) to the amplifiers you can.

This includes what the agent can do, how freely it can act, and what it can access. The MCP/Skills asymmetry is what makes this shift urgent.

Two Mechanisms, One Critical Difference

MCP servers expose deterministic code functions. Each tool takes defined parameters, executes specific code, returns a predictable result. When an agent invokes an MCP tool, the interaction is structured and can be logged relatively easily.

Often, for open source local MCPs, you can read the source code, understand exactly what a tool does, and audit every invocation. Skills are textual instruction sets, files that tell an agent how to handle a repeatable task, for example which tools to use, what workflows to follow, how to handle edge cases.

Skills can also bundle executable scripts the agent may run. The Skills are loaded into the agent's reasoning context, interpreted by the language model.

While you can review Skills before deploying them to the agent, their actual effect depends on model state, conversational history, and context. You cannot enumerate a Skill's possible behaviors the way you can audit a tool's source code.

Reasoning Phase vs. Execution Phase

The Difference Between MCP and Skills

Dimension	MCP Servers	Skills
Behavior	Deterministic	LLM-interpreted, non-deterministic
Reasoning Phase	Tools schemas are loaded to the agent's context	Skills are loaded into the agent's context
Execution phase	Tools are being executed	Scripts from Skills resources can be executed
Observability	Structured, logged tool calls	Opaque reasoning influence
Rug-pull risk	High (auto-update via @latest)	Low (only relevant when Skills auto-update from external sources)
Audit trail	Clear	Minimal

One nuance worth stating plainly, Skills are actually safer than MCP servers in one specific way. Because Skills are usually static files that require deliberate manual updates, they are more resistant to rug-pull attacks, the supply chain vector where a malicious update is silently pushed after the user initially trusted the component. Rug pull risk exists for Skills that are auto-updated from external sources, but this is not a common deployment pattern.

MCP servers are usually packages downloaded from NPM, PYPI, or GitHub. A common misconfiguration is setting the server's version to @latest, which leads to fetch and execution of the newest package version on every agent load, creating a rug pull risk. This misconfiguration is extremely common, and it is a meaningful asymmetry in the other direction.

The Observability Gap

This is the asymmetry that matters most for security teams. When an agent uses an MCP tool, the interaction is visible at the network level: the structured packets sent from the agent to the MCP server and the responses returned can be monitored, logged, and inspected.

Security tooling can observe which tool was called, what parameters were sent, and what came back. Because OSS MCPs tool's function is defined in code, an observed invocation can be mapped directly to a known action. Anomalies can be flagged. Forensic investigation is tractable after the fact.

Skills present a different picture, but the distinction is more precise than a simple "invisible vs. visible." It is possible to observe when an agent loads a Skill into its context: that event is detectable. What is significantly harder is connecting subsequent agent actions back to the Skill that caused them.

A Skill loads, the agent reasons, and then something happens: a file is deleted, an email is sent, data is exfiltrated. The downstream action may be visible.

The causal chain between that action and the specific Skill instructions that produced it is not.

There is no structured event that says 'this action was taken because of this instruction in this Skill file.' You can see the Skill load into context, and you can see the tool calls that follow, but the causal link between the two lives entirely inside the model's reasoning, where no observability framework currently reaches.

The practical consequence: with MCP, you can see what happened and because of which tool. With Skills, you can often see what happened, but determining why, and which Skill was responsible (if any), requires inference rather than observation.

Organizations that govern only their MCP connections have secured the more auditable half of their agent attack surface. The causally opaque half, or Skills, remains almost entirely ungoverned.

High-level architecture of agent using Skills and MCPs



The MCP vs Skills Attack Surface by the Numbers

What we found in the wild: We analyzed hundreds of the most popular MCP servers and Skills and categorized each against a taxonomy of eight risky capability categories.

62% of popular Skills have at least one risky characteristic.

76% of MCPs in organizations carry high-risk capabilities.

With **~180** MCP servers, orgs average **137** high-risk tools connected to agents.

1 in 4 popular MCP servers expose arbitrary code execution.

Capability Category	What it Enables	MCP Prevalence	Skills Prevalence
Untrusted input	Prompt injection exposure	32%	10%
Change of state or data	Data loss, downtime	60%	57%
Arbitrary code/command execution	Full control of the execution environment	25%	10%
Permissions management	Privilege escalation and account takeover	7%	5%
Agent context modification	Persistent manipulation	9%	7%
Financial operations	Direct theft	1.5%	1.5%
Sensitive data access	Sensitive data exposure	5%	2%
External communication	Data leakage	6%	5%

The largest gap between MCPs and Skills is in untrusted input (32% vs. 10%), which reflects MCP servers' design purpose of integrating with external platforms. But retrieval from external sources is precisely what enables prompt injection, and nearly a third of popular MCPs are doing it.

The most prevalent category across both mechanisms is change of state or data (60% of MCPs, 57% of Skills). The majority of agents deployed today can cause irreversible damage, through attacks or hallucination.

The Toxic Combinations

Individual capabilities are concerning. Combinations are where real attacks live. Each combination below is presented as a threat pattern first, then grounded in real-world incidents.

Combination 1: Sensitive data leakage

Untrusted input & sensitive data access & external communication

Threat pattern: An agent that retrieves untrusted content, has access to sensitive data, and can communicate externally is one successful prompt injection away from a complete exfiltration chain. No human in the loop. No audit event linking cause to outcome.

Real world - ContextCrush via Cursor: A developer using Cursor asks for coding help. Cursor's agent invokes the `query-docs` tool from the Context7 MCP server to retrieve library documentation. The attacker has planted a prompt injection payload in the custom rules of a poisoned library on Context7's open registry.

Once the poisoned instructions enter the agent's context, the injection directs Cursor to read sensitive local files using its native `read_file` tool, then exfiltrate the contents externally, either by writing them to a GitHub issue via the `issue_write` tool from the GitHub MCP server, or by executing GitHub CLI commands through Cursor's `bash` tool.

The developer sees normal coding assistance. The attacker receives proprietary source code, credentials, or configuration files in a GitHub issue they control. Each step maps to a different tool in the agent's connected toolset: untrusted input (`query-docs`), sensitive data access (`read_file`), external communication (`issue_write or bash`). The attack is a clean three-tool chain, and every tool involved is one the developer intentionally installed.



50% of MCPs with external communication tools also include tools with capabilities of untrusted input and access to sensitive data. The conditions exist at scale.

Combination 2: Trusted data as attack vector

Untrusted input & sensitive data access (collapsed into a single channel)

Threat pattern: In indirect prompt injection, the attack class the Rule of Two was specifically designed to address, the untrusted input is often embedded within the sensitive data itself. A prompt injection payload hidden inside a document retrieved via RAG doesn't arrive through a separate "untrusted input" channel. It arrives as part of the data the agent was designed to trust.

The two properties collapse into one, and any framework built on their separation breaks down.

Real world - ForcedLeak: An indirect prompt injection embedded in Salesforce Agentforce's trusted CRM data forced the agent to exfiltrate sensitive records. The "untrusted input" is embedded in internal data that is supposed to be safe. The attack succeeded precisely because the agent's RAG pipeline treated poisoned content as authoritative.



Combination 3:
Supply chain to mass compromise

Untrusted input & arbitrary code execution

Threat pattern: A poisoned container image or dependency in a public registry is pulled by an AI agent as part of a routine workflow. The image contains an embedded prompt injection that hijacks the agent's reasoning and provides it with new instructions, triggering arbitrary code or command execution. One poisoned image or dependency reaches every developer or team that pulls it.

Real world - DockerDash: Gordon AI, Docker's AI assistant, assists developers with container workflows. When a developer asks Gordon to analyze or work with a Docker image, the agent pulls the image from Docker Hub, Docker's public registry for container images.

An attacker publishes a poisoned Docker image containing a prompt injection payload embedded in its metadata.

When Gordon processes the image, the injection enters the agent's context and directs it to execute arbitrary commands, chosen by the attacker, on the host system. The attack leverages a capability the agent was designed to have (downloading and inspecting docker images) as the delivery mechanism for a payload that triggers **attacker-controlled arbitrary code execution.**

The developer sees normal container assistance. The attacker achieves RCE on every machine where Gordon pulls the poisoned image.



Combination 4:
Autonomous destruction without an attacker

Change of state/data & excessive autonomy & excessive permissions

Threat pattern: An agent with all three of these amplifiers at maximum can cause catastrophic damage without any adversarial input at all. Hallucination alone is sufficient. An agent that misinterprets an ambiguous instruction can permanently delete files, lock users out of services, or escalate its own permissions. The more autonomous the agent, the longer this goes undetected.

Real world - Replit: Replit's AI coding agent deleted an entire production database containing over 1,200 executive records during a code freeze. No attacker was involved. The agent had excessive capabilities (full database write/delete access), excessive autonomy (no human checkpoint before destructive operations), and excessive permissions (credentials that allowed production database deletion). Mapped to the CAP framework: turning down any single dial would have prevented the outcome. Turning down all three would have made it structurally impossible.

Real world - Amazon Q: A hacker injected a destructive prompt into the Amazon Q extension for VS Code via a GitHub pull request. The embedded instruction told the agent to wipe the local filesystem and delete AWS cloud resources.

The agent had excessive capabilities (filesystem and cloud resource access), excessive autonomy (no approval gate before destructive actions), and excessive permissions (credentials scoped to production AWS resources). No exfiltration. No external communication. Just capabilities and autonomy, with no attacker needing more than a pull request.

No popular MCP currently carries the full three-way combination of change of state, permissions management, and arbitrary execution in a single server. But the components exist across multiple servers used by the same agents. The risk is compositional.

Combination 5:
Discreet financial fraud

Agent long-term context modification & financial operations

Threat pattern: This is the hardest combination to detect because it requires no injection at execution time. A malicious insider modifies the agent's long-term memory or system instructions to establish a persistent behavioral pattern, transferring small amounts to an external account under specific conditions. The agent executes autonomously, on its own schedule. The transfers look like normal agentic behavior, not an attack. The cause may never be traced.

1.5% of both MCPs and Skills expose financial operations. **9%** of MCPs allow long-term context modification.

The conditions for this attack class exist in production today.

The No Excessive CAP Framework

The No Excessive CAP Framework

The dominant approach to agent security focuses on the sources of risk, meaning blocking malicious inputs, detecting injection patterns, scanning for known-bad content. **This approach is incomplete because it governs variables you cannot fully control.**

You cannot guarantee that every MCP server is free of poisoned descriptions. You cannot ensure that every Skill is benign. Threats will always exist. **What you can control is the amplifiers of risk, what your agents are able to do with the manipulation they receive.**

Building on OWASP LLM06:2025, Noma's No Excessive CAP framework governs agent risk across three dimensions you actually control:



C: Capabilities

What can this agent do? Every tool added and every Skill installed moves this dial. The question for each is, if this capability were triggered under adversarial conditions, what is the worst outcome?

Control: Whitelist tools, prefer atomic over non-atomic, remove anything not actively required.

A: Autonomy

How much can this agent decide on its own? Autonomy defines the gap between a compromised instruction and a harmful outcome. Every unsupervised action is an opportunity for an attack to complete undetected.

Control: Require human approval for irreversible or high-blast-radius actions; calibrate threshold inversely to capabilities.

P: Permissions

What identity does this agent run under? An over-privileged agent running on a shared service account gives an attacker the entire account's access surface.

Control: Delegated user-scoped credentials, dynamic least-privilege, no shared machine identities.

Figure 5: The No Excessive CAP interactive dials: Capabilities, Autonomy, Permissions with combined blast radius meter

Why the research focuses on Capabilities, and what that means for the other two dials

The data presented in this paper skews heavily toward Capabilities, and that's intentional. Capabilities are the one CAP dimension that can be measured externally at scale. We can analyze public MCP servers and Skills, categorize what they enable, and produce prevalence data that applies across the industry.

The No Excessive CAP Framework

Autonomy and Permissions are different. They are not properties of the tools themselves. They are properties of how your organization deploys those tools. Two companies can connect the same MCP server and end up with radically different risk profiles depending on whether they gate destructive actions behind human approval and whether the agent runs on a scoped user identity or a shared service account with admin credentials.

This means the research can tell you which capabilities are in your environment and how they combine into toxic patterns. It cannot tell you how much autonomy you've granted or how your permissions are scoped. **Those are your dials to assess.**

Control Area	What to Do	MCP-Specific	Skills-Specific
Capabilities	Allowlist only what the agent's task requires. Map blast radius per tool.	Pin server versions, never run @latest. Isolate local MCP execution.	Audit Skills and their resources before deployment. Review instruction text for embedded injection.
Atomic execution	Prefer specific, bounded tools over arbitrary execution.	Replace non-atomic tools where alternatives exist.	Avoid Skills that instruct agents to run arbitrary shell commands.
Input handling	Sanitize all content from untrusted sources before it enters context.	Apply sanitization to all MCP-retrieved external content.	Restrict Skills that instruct agents to ingest unvalidated external data.
Autonomy	Require human approval of dangerous capabilities.	Monitor tool invocation chains for toxic combination patterns.	Since Skill reasoning is opaque, monitor at the execution layer. What the agent does is your signal.
Permissions	No shared machine identities. Delegated, user-scoped credentials only.	Set connections to MCP servers using OAuth.	Run agents in isolated environments so script execution cannot reach host resources.

The No Excessive CAP Framework

Approaching Autonomy Governance

Start by mapping every agent workflow that includes an irreversible action: database writes, file deletions, permission changes, financial transactions, external communications containing internal data. For each, answer one question: if this action were triggered by a hallucination or a successful prompt injection, would a human have an opportunity to stop it before it completes? If the answer is no, that workflow needs an approval gate.

The threshold should be calibrated inversely to capabilities. The more powerful the tools an agent can invoke, the less autonomy it should have. Agents with access to arbitrary code execution or cross-system write access should require human approval for virtually every action outside a narrowly defined happy path.

Agents scoped to read-only informational queries can operate with more freedom. Autonomy isn't binary, and the goal isn't to put a human in front of every action. The goal is to ensure that the actions with the highest blast radius cannot complete without one.

Approaching Permissions Governance

The most common failure mode is the static, over-privileged service account. An agent running on a shared machine identity with broad access gives every attack (and every hallucination) the full scope of that account's permissions. The fix is delegated, user-scoped credentials: the agent inherits only the permissions of the human it's acting on behalf of, and those permissions expire.

Three questions to audit against: (1) Does this agent run on a shared identity or a per-user delegated identity? If shared, it's over-privileged by default. (2) Are the agent's credentials scoped to the minimum permissions its task requires, or does it inherit a broad role? (3) Do the agent's credentials expire, or do they persist indefinitely? The answers to these questions determine whether a successful attack yields access to one user's data for a limited window or access to everything the service account can reach, forever.

Neither Autonomy nor Permissions will show up in a scan of your MCP servers or Skills. They require organizational assessment. But they are also **the two dials most likely to determine whether an incident is a near-miss or a catastrophe.** The Replit and Amazon Q cases make this concrete: the capabilities were the precondition, but it was unchecked autonomy and over-scoped permissions that allowed the damage to actually land.

The three dimensions interact multiplicatively. An agent with broad capabilities but near-zero autonomy is manageable, a human catches the malicious invocation before it completes. The dangerous configuration is all three dials simultaneously elevated: an agent that can do anything, decides everything autonomously, and runs with god-mode credentials.

That is not a risk posture. It is a countdown.

The CAP framework applies uniformly to both MCP and Skill risk, and this is precisely its value. Because Skill-driven behavior is opaque at the reasoning level, you must compensate with tighter controls on the execution level. The asymmetry in observability demands an asymmetry in governance.

Conclusion

The AI agent security problem is an asymmetry problem.

One half of the capability stack, MCP servers, is observable, structured, and responds to familiar security controls.

The other half, Skills, is opaque, non-deterministic, and largely invisible to current tooling. **Organizations governing only the first half (e.g., via MCP gateways) have not solved the problem.** They have solved the easier half of it.

The No Excessive CAP framework works precisely because it does not depend on observability. You cannot monitor what a Skill is causing an agent to reason.

But you can control what the agent can do with that reasoning, how freely it can act, and what it can access. Those three dials are yours.

The question is not whether your agents will encounter malicious inputs, poisoned tools, or manipulative Skill instructions. They will. The question is what you have done to limit what those agents can do with the manipulation they receive.

With Noma, you can discover, govern, and protect AI and agents across the enterprise, from homegrown AI to SaaS agents and coding assistants. Navigate Agentic AI security - and whatever comes next - with Noma Security.

To learn more: noma.security

NOMA

Secure your AI, **Everywhere**

Noma is the leading AI security platform for the enterprise, purpose-built to secure every type of AI and agent across the organization, from homegrown agents and applications, to SaaS agent platforms like Microsoft Copilot Studio and Salesforce AgentForce, to coding assistants and MCP servers.

Noma delivers full discovery and governance across the AI environment, AI red teaming to harden the agentic security posture, and runtime protection that enforces guardrails against prompt injection, data exfiltration, and policy violations.

AWS selected Noma as their AI security platform for their Security Hub, and Microsoft and Databricks are strategic partners. Trusted by Fortune **500** companies and backed by **$130M+** in funding, Noma is the established market leader in AI security.